[hereinafter SAMSHA1] http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DR-FRR4-2014%20(1)/NSDUH-DR-FRR4-2014.pdf ("Substance use and abuse are major public health problems in the United States.").
2.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN.,, RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 9 (2014) [hereinafter SAMSHA2] http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSD UHresults2013.pdf ("NSDUH is a primary source of statistical information on the use of illicit substance goes up, so does the likelihood that youth used the substance in the past month. 11 When this dynamic is compounded by an actual availability of the controlled substance in the youth's locality, serious problems and concerns arise regarding use of illicit substances by the adolescent population. 12 8.
SAMSHA1, supra note 1, at 1.
9. SAMSHA1, supra note 1, at 1; SAMSHA2, supra note 2, at 71.
10. SAMSHA2, supra note 2, at 76; see also SAMSHA1, supra note 1; id. at 12 ("Many studies have demonstrated that the availability of drugs (i.e., ease of obtaining drugs) is associated with drug initiation and use.").
11.
See SAMSHA2, supra note 2, at 75-76; id. at 76 (noting that approximately "one in eight youths aged 12 to 17 [] indicated that they had been approached by someone selling drugs in the past month.").
12.
See SAMSHA2, supra note 2, at 6 ("In 2013, 39.0 percent of youths aged 12 to 17 perceived great risk in having five or more drinks once or twice a week. Similarly, To address these problems, states have implemented drug-free zone laws ("DFZLs"). Recognizing governmental systems, education centers, and aspects of the community as "domains of influence" from which to address illicit drug use by youth, 13 DFZLs reflect an effort to reduce the use of controlled substances by youth and reduce the harms illicit drug activity poses to such individuals. 14 More specifically, this effort has aimed to reduce the availability (perceived or actual) of such substances and foster protected environments for youth populations. 15 Drug-free Zone Laws 39.5 percent of youths perceived great risk in smoking marijuana once or twice a week. . . . About half (48.6 percent) of youths aged 12 to 17 reported in 2013 that it would be "fairly easy" or "very easy" for them to obtain marijuana if they wanted some. One in eleven reported it would be easy to get heroin (9.1 percent), 11.3 percent indicated that LSD would be easily available, and 14.4 percent reported easy availability for cocaine. In comparison with the rates in 2002, the 2013 rates represent declines in perceived availability for all four of these drugs. About one in eight youths aged 12 to 17 (12.4 percent) indicated that they had been approached by someone selling drugs in the past month, which was similar to the rate in 2012 (13.2 percent).").
13.
SAMSHA1, supra note 1; SAMSHA2, supra note 2, at 71. PROTECT YOUTH 3 (2006) http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/SchoolZonesReport06.pdf
15.
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14; see also JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14.
DFZLs are based on the premise that drug trafficking in certain locations creates risk factors that pose danger to children. 16 To limit youth exposure to illegal drug activity, lawmakers established protected "buffer zones" around places where children most likely frequented or were present. 17 In an effort to deter unwanted drug activity, DFZL violators are subjected to "substantially higher penalties than others who engaged in the same conduct outside the zone." 18 Proscribed locations under these laws have included schools and school bus stops, childcare centers, parks, recreation centers, public housing, and the like. 19 For example, a law imposing drugfree zones might forbid conspiring to or actually possessing, selling, or manufacturing a controlled substance within a certain distance of proscribed locales. 
New Jersey
New Jersey was one of the first states to enact its own version of the federal DFZL, so appropriately, it was the first to seriously scrutinize the effects of the law. 31 The original New Jersey law prohibited distributing, 28 .
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 21 (noting substantial disparate impacts in Cook County, Illinois, on minority youth under the state DFZL).
29.
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14 passim; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14 passim.
30.
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 28 ("Reports from the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Agency on the prevalence of illicit drug use consistently show that blacks, whites, and Hispanics use at similar rates.").
31.
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14 (noting that New Jersey first enacted a DFZL in 1987).
dispensing, or possessing with intent to distribute drugs within a 1,000-foot zone around schools. 32 Approximately a decade later New Jersey lawmakers added a 500-foot zone for drug sales around parks, libraries, museums, and public housing complexes. 33 In 2004, the New Jersey state legislature established the New Jersey Commission to Review Criminal Sentencing to conduct an investigation on the state's DFZL and its impacts. 34 After a comprehensive analysis of the DFZL, the Commission found that the law had no deterrent effect: it failed entirely to drive drug activity away from schools. Additionally, the DFZL was a major contributor to alarming levels of racial disparity in incarceration. 35 The Commission found that the intended policy purpose of driving drug activity away from youth and the locales they frequent was undermined by the fact that many densely populated or developed urban areas overlapped under the DFZL, which effectively turned entire 32.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that "school" in the statute incorporates daycare centers, vocational training centers, and other educational facilities); see also JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 22.
33.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5.
34
. JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 3, 25; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5.
35.
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 3-4.
communities into prohibited zones. 36 According to Judge Barnett Hoffman, chair of the Commission and a presiding county court judge of the Middlesex County court, "Giant unbroken drug-free zones . . . actually dilute the special protection the laws are supposed to offer" because such overlapping zones create "a net so large that we pull in every fish whether it's the type of fish we're looking for or not." 37 The distinction the New Jersey law aspired to create between drug-free zones and other areas was negated, resulting in no measurable deterrent effect.
Additionally, New Jersey's DFZL created an unwarranted racial disparity because it blanketed densely populated minority neighborhoods resulting in a "devastating impact on minority defendants." 38 The
Commission labeled this effect of population density on the likelihood of being arrested and convicted under the state's DFZL as the "urban effect." 39 The
36.
Id. at 4 (" [T] he Commission determined that the laws had failed entirely to accomplish their primary objective of driving drug activity away from schools and schoolchildren. The Commission found that the law had no measurable deterrent effect and was not being used to sanction individuals that sell drugs to children.").
37.
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 26.
38. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5-6 ("Nearly every defendant (96%) convicted and incarcerated for a drug-free zone offense in New Jersey was either black or Latino."); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 14; id. at 26 ("According to the commissioners, the problem stems primarily from the "urban effect" of the law's current zone configuration. They argue that the enormous racial disparity produced by the schoolzone enhancement is a function of differing population density in communities where the majority of whites and people of color live."). Id.
51.
Id.
52. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5.
53
. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5 (Brownsberger argues that a special penalty to protect children is a good idea, but that the Massachusetts law is drawn too broadly to have that effect. By blanketing large geographic areas with drug-free zones, the law makes it virtually impossible for sellers to avoid them. As Brownsberger puts it, "We're not giving anyone any incentive not to sell drugs near schools." He recommends reducing the zone to between 100 to 250 feet.).
to live within a drug-free zone as residents of rural areas [and] that more than half of black and Hispanic residents lived in drug-free zones while less than a third of white residents" lived in such a zone. 54 As a result of this research, legislators on Massachusetts's joint Judiciary Committee approved a bill that would have shrunk the size of the zones and limited the hours of their effectiveness, though the bill died on the floor of the general assembly. 55 However, with the endorsement of Governor Deval Patrick, the General Assembly subsequently enacted a law reducing the size of Massachusetts's DFZL zones from 1,000 feet to 300 feet and limiting the operation of the zones from 5 a.m.-midnight. 56 
Indiana
Research on Indiana's DFZL also demonstrates that the size of the drug-free zones imposed by under law can render a law ineffective as a deterrent and result in disparate treatment. Indiana's DFZL, first adopted in 1987, increased the felony class of the underlying drug offense if it occurred within 1,000 feet of school property, a public park, a public housing complex, or a youth program center. 57 In response to rising concerns, both locally and 54.
55.
56.
Id. Tennessee's DFZL is similar to the prior statutory scheme of jurisdictions that investigated and revised their DFZLs. For example,
Tennessee employs a 1,000-foot buffer zone. This is similar to Massachusetts's previous DFZL, which employed a 1,000-foot zone and a 100-foot zone; 72 Indiana's previous DFZL, which imposed a 1,000-foot zone; 73 New 68. Id.
69.
70.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432(b)(2), (3).
71.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-432(b)(3) ("A person convicted of violating this subsection (b), who is within the prohibited zone of a preschool, childcare center, public library, recreational center or park shall not be subject to additional incarceration as a result of this subsection (b) but shall be subject to the additional fines imposed by this section.").
72.
Jersey's former DFZL, which used a 1,000-foot zone and a 500-foot zone; and Delaware, which previously imposed a 1,000-foot zone. 74 Although other
states have recorded problems with their DFZL, 75 detailed research and analysis of the DFZLs in these four states show that 1,000-foot "buffer zones,"
particularly in the presence of certain demographics, are large enough to negate the laws' primary purpose of driving drug activity away from proscribed locations. These findings have already caused other jurisdictions to reduce their 1,000-foot drug-free zones. 76 Moreover, these same jurisdictions noted disproportional and disparate impacts throughout the studied communities, which suggests similar concerns for Tennessee.
Additionally, many of the jurisdictions studied, such as in Massachusetts and Indiana, involved DFZLs that proscribed localities substantially similar to those covered by Tennessee's DFZL. For example, Massachusetts's DFZL created drug-free zones around schools, day cares,
73.
Id. at 4.
74.
75.
Id. at 3-4 (noting and discussing Connecticut's reform on its DFZL); id. at 3, 5 (noting and discussing Kentucky's reform on its DFZL); id. at 6 (South Carolina modified the triggers for penalty enhancements by requiring "that anyone arrested for a drug offense in an enhancement zone must have knowledge that he or she was in a restricted area with the intent of selling."); JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 21 (noting Illinois's reform of its treatment of its DFZL in relation to juveniles).
76.
See e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 4 (noting Delaware's reduction in the zone size created by the state's DFZL).
81.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 5; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 15.
82.
See 
88.
Id. at 30 (discussing how the model created predicts "whether or not a [Tennessee] suspect is charged with enhanced penalties" under the States DFZL with 89.7% accuracy).
89.
Id. at 34-35 (finding that under the applied model, being "black" raises the odds a suspect will be charged under Tennessee's DFZL by a factor of roughly 6.5). But see expressed by Tennessee's legal community regarding the state's DFZL. 92 Ultimately, the concern expressed 93 questions the effectiveness and practical implications of Tennessee's DFZL, and in light of wide spread data on the topic, this concern is anything but a chimera. 
93.
James Nix, What Drug-free School Zones Do for Cops, Criminals, THE CITY PAPER, (Nov. 12, 2010, 3: 55 PM) (quoting assistant public defender from Nashville, Tennessee, Melissa Harrison) http://nashvillecitypaper.com/content/city-news/what-drugfree-school-zones-do-cops-criminals ("Harrison points out there are no safeguards to preventing police from intentionally stopping someone in a school zone, and "the other thing is that almost anywhere is within 1,000 feet of a school.'"); see also 
97.
See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 14, at 26 (discussing the efforts of Judge Barnett Hoffman, a presiding judge of the Middlesex County court).
98.
See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 4 (discussing the efforts of Governor Mike Pence); id. at 5 (discussing the efforts of Governor Deval Patrick); id. at 6 (discussing the efforts of Governor Jon Corzine).
99.
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 14, at 3-4 http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/sen_Drug-Free%20Zone%20Laws.pdf ("Further reforms may soon be enacted. In the 2013 legislative session, Connecticut's Black and Puerto Rican Caucus sponsored a bill that would have reduced the size of the state's drug-free zones from 1,500 feet to 300 feet. The bill was debated in the Connecticut House of Representatives but Republican opponents succeeded in filibustering the bill and its time expired without a vote. As a result, the bill stalled and will not become law for 2013. Nevertheless proponents of the bill have vowed to introduce it again in the next legislative session."). under Tennessee's DFZL, removing the buffer zones around "recreational centers," and avoiding the creation of buffer zones around "public housing."
At the very least, in the interest of justice, this report urges a state congressionally led evaluation of Tennessee's DFZL to ensure the effectiveness and value of the legislation.
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